Political discourse in the Norwegian welfare state is characterized by the ambition to establish and secure universal welfare. In comparative terms, it has been quite successful in translating utopian goals to practical politics. The modernization of Norway, more so than most other western countries, has nourished a shared sense of politics as a collective activity and as the privileged tool for the realization of humanistic goals. The article attempts to show how this presumably salient element of Norwegian political culture developed as a part of the extraordinary continuity, characterizing both economic growth and the strengthening of a sense of political community, transcending the divisive effects of class differences. The contemporary version of local political discourse in Norway, while keeping the ambition of universal welfare very much alive, is faced with severe overload problems. Thus, local politicians, responsible as they areboth ideologically and institutionally -for providing welfare for the local population, find themselves simultaneously deeply involved in attempts to control swelling budgets and act according to the ideals of rational organizational management. These politicians think and act within an institutional field that, probably more so than most other such fields in modern society, is characterized by deep contradictions. By focusing on the complexity of the ideological and institutional field of local politics, the article demonstrates not only that this particular field absorbs contradictions, but that it transforms political activity and the politicians' sense of self in specific ways. Politicians often experience a sense of personal fragmentation as they attempt to represent their constituencies and 'the weak ones in society', develop policies, represent the state's budget reduction requirements, control the municipal organization, while remaining loyal both to the bureaucracy and their sense of moral self. The concept of complexity helps to illuminate the ways in which the cleavages of early industrial society have 'migrated', as it were, from the realm of political collectivities to the level of the self.
THE PROBLEM
In his now classic study, Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980) , Lipsky points out that bureaucracies incorporate, reflect and somehow apply values from wider society. I would like to add to this observation that, in so doing, bureaucracies tend to take on a peculiar character as functional hybrids, often combining conservative stability with an extraordinary capacity for generating cultural transformation in their environments.
If such a hypothesis is warranted, one of the tasks of anthropology must be to describe the power and significance of bureaucracies in contemporary culture by analyzing their dynamics and the consequences of those dynamics. In myriad ways, bureaucracies mediate actions, relations and symbolic processes. For instance, a characteristic feature of modernity, as many theorists have pointed out, is that increasing individualization, involving increasing awareness of oneself as a unique being and one's choices as tools for developing a credible biography and a desirable career, is intimately linked with increasing institutionalization (Foucault, 1979; Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992) . This insight, although not at all new, throws light on the apparent paradox that the process by which people construct themselves as individuals is also the same process by which they make themselves governable by complex institutions. They transform themselves, but they are, at the same time, transformed. How does this happen, and what are the implications in terms of understanding cultural change in complex society?
Bureaucracies function as simplifying mechanisms. They standardize variety and enforce categorical boundaries. They classify the world and offer procedures for manipulating these classifications so that they can be presented as 'products' or as 'services'. Perhaps for this reason bureaucracies are often viewed as dealing in a kind of brutal standardization. They may well do precisely that, but a much more striking aspect of bureaucracies, particularly public bureaucracies that deal with populations at large, is that, in order to simplify and standardize, they incorporate complexity.
These initial observations have been inspired by my research on Norwegian local politics and government. In this research I use the institutions of local government as a prism for viewing and analyzing the different aspects of political culture. What has struck me during my fieldwork in Norwegian municipalities is the extreme complexity that characterizes the processes that go on in them. In part, this complexity is the result of the enormous variety of tasks that need to be taken care of, more or less co-operatively, by a very large number of people. It also results from the accumulation of things that, logically, just do not go together.
In Street-Level Bureaucracy, Lipsky observed that public bureaucracies are caught in a fundamental contradiction between what kinds, and the amount of services they are supposed to provide, and what they are, in fact, capable of and permitted to provide. This contradiction plays a central role in the daily work of street-level bureaucrats, and disillusions, alienates and exhausts many of them. Its real effect is even greater for those at whom the services are aimed: students in dilapidated schools sitting in overcrowded classrooms, welfare recipients, people in need of legal aid, and many others. The contradiction is also felt by the decision-makers and administrative superiors who, more or less, believe that continuous administrative reforms improve the efficiency and quality of services.
In other words, street-level bureaucracies are characterized by a peculiar kind of complexity. In transforming cultural experience, often formulated in terms of political ideology, into practice, and thereby also transforming social relationships and identities, bureaucrats mobilize a multitude of contradictory ideals, expectations, and versions of what actually goes on, and indeed, what ought to go on. One effect of this kind of complexity is the fact that street-level bureaucrats experience a personal dilemma, resulting from their incapacity to do what they ought to do.
Street-level bureaucrats often find themselves in contested fields. As members of 'organizations of hypocrisy' (Brunsson, 1989 ) -i.e. organizations which, simultaneously, incorporate and reflect ideologies and values in conflict, and that also transform eventual compromises into standardized procedures and practices -they face contradictory, and often overwhelming, expectations from superior administrative levels. Moreover, these expectations are formulated in contradictory formats. While administrators and politicians tend to rely on instrumental criteria to manage these expectations, the public and also many politicians evaluate administrative policies and procedures in terms of whether or not they realize a specific ideological, and typically humanitarian, vision.
Street-level bureaucrats are expected to provide, as one social worker said, 'more service for less money'. At the same time, they are expected to make themselves superfluous by enabling the marginalized to stand on their own feet, economically and socially. The dilemma is highlighted in their face-to-face encounters with clients, who must be seen, simultaneously, as costs (that is, as people in need of social resources) and as symbols of the welfare state's vision to realize equity and justice. This type of complexity is different from the forms of complexity usually discussed by anthropologists, which are mainly outside bureaucratically organized realms (Barth, 1989) . Bureaucratic complexity may be analytically graspable in terms of anthropological theories of complexity, but it requires an acute sensitivity to the transformative potential of formal organizations. Formal organizations transform values, identities and discourses by abstracting and reifying them, as well as disembedding them -more or less thoroughly -from time and place. According to Giddens:
The point here is not primarily that many social characteristics which were previously part of everyday life or the 'lifeworld' become drawn off and incorporated into abstract systems. Rather, the tissue and form of day-to-day life becomes reshaped in conjunction with wider social changes. Routines which are structured by abstract systems have an empty, unmoralised character. This much is valid in the idea that the impersonal increasingly swamps the personal. But this is not simply a diminishment of personal life in favour of impersonally organized systems; it is a genuine transformation of the nature of the personal itself. (Giddens, 1991: 120) I want to argue that in Norwegian local government, these contradictions and tensions are much more severe and influential than Lipsky demonstrated in his classic study. This is so, I assume, because the Norwegian government (at the local and national level) must deal with welfare ambitions and democratic ideals that are particularly strong. To a greater extent than other welfare states, even other Scandinavian ones, the Norwegian state continues to insist that the entire population is its 'customer', regardless of purchase power or status (Esping-Andersen, 1990 ). In principle, there is no way the state can adjust demand according to its own productive potential. Absorbing traditions of popular democratic participation and ideals of universal welfare, the Norwegian welfare state administers a large cluster of things that, logically, do not go together. Recently, the gap between ambitions and financial resources has turned into a major overload problem. The result is a curious mix of classic, modernist, ideological welfareism combined with a greater emphasis on administrative managerialism. The recent aim of the Norwegian government, particularly at the local level, has been to establish instrumental control over a system which is, in practice, unbounded. I want to explore who pays the price for this strategy, and how this strategy is employed.
I will try to demonstrate that local Norwegian politicians are riddled with the same 'dilemmas of complexity' described by Lipsky, because they take on roles that are deeply characterized by ambivalence. I want to argue that the complexity of Norwegian local government is not only a question of what happens when different cultural traditions, for instance welfareism and managerialism, 'meet'. One must also consider the extent to which (i) people, as consumers of services, (ii) politicians, as spokespersons of 'weak groups' and, at the same time, guardians of scarce resources, and (iii) bureaucrats, as the frontier of the welfare state expansion and, simultaneously, the engineers of governance, have transformed the very cultural traditions that produced them.
Influenced by Mary Douglas's work on purity and danger (1966), Bauman (1991) came to understand modernity in terms of a general bureaucratic obsession with eliminating ambiguity. This perspective has more implications than Bauman foresaw. Social interactions in modern society are predominantly transactional and contractual in character, because most of life's interactions occur in various permutations of the marketplace. For example, organizations intended to facilitate people's participation in sports and other leisure activities have become much more transactional over the last few decades, taking their income from membership fees and various sources that do not involve the consumers as participants (Selle and Øymyr, 1995) . Accordingly, such organizations have become more differentiated than previously in terms of their organizational set-up. Now, for example, a function of managers is to guard the organizations' boundaries against free-loaders. At the individual level, this process of bureaucratization leads people to see the institutional environment as comprised of resources to be used for both enhancing personal opportunities and for constructing identities from a career metaphor (Berger et al., 1974; Giddens, 1991) . Until recently, this tendency had not become full-blown in Norway because identities were shaped by a personal sense of belonging to fairly stable life-styles, and status groups based on class. Previously, the contexts that embed a person's reference groups were not seen as waystations along a person's career route but were understood as being more or less permanent.
Also, people in the public sector are much more sharply defined as consumers of public services than before. In many ways, this has simplified life by simplifying the criteria for access to these services. For example, hospitals are increasingly governed and regulated by administrative systems that seek to reduce, if not eliminate, ambivalence. By breaking activities down into items with specific value weightings, it thus allows for the creation of incentives and precise estimates of productivity.
However, this standardization of life-contexts has not solved the problem of how to provide equal access to welfare services for all, regardless of their purchasing power. Interestingly, the standardizing of life-contexts has also led to an accumulation of ambivalence within local government institutions. These institutions cannot simply eliminate ambiguity by separating insiders from outsiders because, in principle, everyone is an insider.
Standardizing life-contexts has had the effect of removing incentives for people to participate in public life as 'citizens', that is, as caretakers of common goods. Local politicians face increasing hostility from the local population which, in its capacity as an aggregate of consumers, aggressively confronts them about their inability to provide services to which they, the consumers, are entitled. The media exacerbates this tension by selectively presenting cases that portray the hardships of old or handicapped people who are inadequately provided for by the municipality. Sørensen and Stråth (1997) point out that the Nordic welfare state has been instrumental in linking individual rights to public services, thus propagating a unique and very modern brand of individualization. Children, for example, have the right to be protected from their parents, and this right is strongly enforced through extensive municipal child care. Beck (1992) argued that such practices generate a radically different political outlook than those upon which the welfare state was established, because they de-couple the individual from the collectivities he or she identifies (and is identified) with. Consequently, the individual is potentially separated from the aggregate consequences of individual expectations and the demands of the individuals who comprise these collectivities.
In order to analytically grasp the cultural traditions that underpin any welfare state, we first need to write the histories of those states. The writing of such histories is needed because state institutions emerge at particular periods of time and are modified or discarded as times change. For the modern state this historical process is characterized by class tensions, ideological confrontations, and political compromises. For the Norwegian state, the investigation of these traditions is particularly fascinating because of the high degree of ideological and institutional continuity across time. The idea of universal welfare has been a basic element of this continuity and has, historically, been adjusted to accommodate different realities. Hence, Norwegian politicians often speak of 'the welfare state' as an unambiguous phenomenon born from an unambiguous political ideology anchored in the popular will of 'the people'.
The Norwegian welfare state has been deeply transformed by economic scarcity, a changing political culture, modern management philosophy and economic integration in a global economy. Yet the ambition to reach everyone, regardless of their purchase power, prevails. Historically, the types of services provided by municipalities, as well as their scope, have expanded enormously. This constitutes a fundamental fact of these institutions, a fact which has not been changed in any direct way, and one which does not seem to be paralleled by any other kind of organization in the modern world.
HISTORIES
From a comparative perspective, the construction of the Norwegian state must be seen as a special case in European modernization. A colony under Denmark until 1814, it was handed over to Sweden after the Napoleonic wars. This stimulated the development of a strong independence movement, nationalist in typical European fashion, and also the growth of democratic institutions under Swedish rule. Due to factors specific to Norway -an egalitarian social structure dominated by mostly free land-owning peasants, extremely rich material conditions, and a relatively weak economic and administrative elite -this process was profoundly shaped by peasant influence. To a greater degree than in most countries, nationalist sentiments were channeled into political participation in institutions that were gradually democratized. Rune Slagstad's study (1998) showed that 19th-century Norwegian elites responded to the process of democratization in liberal rather than repressive terms, because they realized that their rule depended on co-opting peasants and the rising working class. Another stimulus for this strategy was the fact that the growing Norwegian colonial state was financially weak and depended on attracting capital from the rising bourgeoisie and entrepreneur-peasants. The elites realized their weakness with full force in 1884, when the peasant-dominated democratic majority won the struggle for a parliamentary system, a struggle that also undermined Swedish rule, ending it peacefully in 1905.
Norwegian independence happened at a time when the state had already been democratized. Thus, when technological innovations made the mobilization of natural resources possible, the new elites were already politically and morally bounded by a commitment to the nation. Since the growth of the state had been so heavily influenced by nationalist, popular participation, it was generally seen by Norwegians as an extension of the masses rather than a tool of the elites. The Second World War added to the ideology of the democratic state by uniting people in the image of the nation, expressing itself through representations of working-class heroes whose legitimacy was based on their role in leading and organizing Norwegian resistance to National Socialist Germany.
In the period following the Second World War, extreme economic growth and full employment contributed to a strong sense of the population belonging to a welfare community. Although the seeds of the welfare state were sown much earlier, it was fully realized during this period and extended to include not only free services for all in education and health, but also offered welfare provisions that guaranteed decent life conditions for marginal groups. To the extent that we may speak of a 'welfare ideology' in Norway, it was shaped during this period. Local politicians increasingly dealt with the daily management of welfare policies, and came to accept the idea that their primary task was (and is) to secure the welfare of everyone. This is a deeply moral task, creating severe problems in all situations where such an ambition collides with economic scarcity. It is important to note that most local politicians are from average income groups, and are not identified with elite, bourgeois culture or a distant state. Local politicians have historically been very sensitive to the demands and complaints of their constituencies.
In the early 1980s, the era of unlimited growth and, to quote Beck (1992) , 'simple modernization' was threatened by an increasing sense of economic scarcity. The municipal sector was put under strong pressure to reorganize and manage its resources more effectively, and modern management philosophy was introduced and increasingly applied. During my first period of fieldwork, in a small industrial municipality in southeast Norway, I experienced this in terms of very strong conflicts between local bureaucrats and elite politicians -both of whom are oriented towards rational planning and effective economic management -and 'grassroot politicians', who insisted on experience-near political discourse, rejecting abstract, economic calculations as the foundation for political decisions (Vike, 1991) .
Five years later, during a second period of fieldwork in a town of 50,000 in the same area, I observed the same type of conflict, but this time it took a completely different form. This time, no one objected to the need to be economically 'realistic' and to execute only those services that the municipality could afford. However, local politicians also wanted to realize universal welfare and sought alternative strategies to achieve this end. This dual strategy should not only be seen in the context of the post-war welfare ideology described earlier, but also as a consequence of state policies demanding municipalities to provide services to all, including such newly recognized 'weak groups' as abused children, and psychiatric patients.
During this fieldwork period I observed a series of conflicts resulting directly from this budget crisis. These conflicts did not separate people into distinguishable groups, but cut through them and even through individual persons. For instance, I frequently observed local politicians vacillate between being hard-headed spokespersons for 'the weak groups' only to subsequently argue that many people are really scavengers of municipal funds and that it is important to be 'realistic' and make the 'necessary' cutbacks in order to achieve a balanced budget.
From the foregoing discussion we can discern the contours of a culturally specific construction of 'people' as individuals (the object of welfare), the state, and of responsible government. All these categories are deeply contested in contemporary local politics in Norway. They are played out in myriad contexts in which they mix, support and undermine each other in ways that seem not at all transparent to those applying them. Hence, this gives rise to processes that are hard to monitor and control. I now want to present an extended case study that describes the interplay between these various groups in practice. The case was documented during fieldwork in the Norwegian municipality of Skien in 1993. Skien is located on the south-east coast, and is the largest town in the county of Telemark. Characterized by heavy industry, the southern part of Telemark is strongly influenced by the social democratic traditions of local government, involving a high level of political activity, especially in the Labor Party, and has a 'proletarian' social structure.
WELFARE POLICY IN THE MAKING
In 1993, local politicians in Skien were confronted by the need to make a stand concerning welfare policies. The trigger was the realization that the municipal budget could not maintain the level of current expenses and cut-backs had to be made. The process developed in three distinct phases.
Phase 1: the welfare issue
The social welfare issue was presented during the spring of 1993 and was motivated by the need to save money. The proposition forwarded by the municipal administration to the Health and Welfare Committee was to reduce welfare payments to unemployed people who, because of additional problems, were unlikely to obtain jobs. For many years, the municipality had struggled to reduce the social welfare budget, the 'explosion' of which seemed to have become an annual phenomenon, due to 'unrealistic budgeting'. Because the criteria for making payments are largely defined nationally, attempts to establish better control over the local budget has had little effect. Moreover, the municipality has little influence on the number of unemployed and other persons in need who turn to the social office for help. Because of high unemployment rates during the early 1990s, the number of people applying for welfare rose.
A main argument for the need to reduce municipal expenses was that it was necessary to bring the standard in line with that of the neighboring municipalities, where payments were somewhat lower. Some politicians worried that many of Skien's clients were 'welfare migrants' from neighboring municipalities. Most important, however, was the need to save money and to eliminate misappropriations of welfare funds. The underlying premise was that implementing budgetary constraints did not represent a fundamental break with the idea that everyone, including the unemployed and those experiencing various social problems, has access to material and social welfare. The issue evoked heated debate that revolved around this underlying premise. Hence, politicians had to clarify the criteria for identifying those clients who really deserved support from those who did not. What kinds of people are these and how does one establish such definitions? The conflicting definitions developed in the Committee were predicated upon diverging interpretations of the moral basis of this issue: that is, should qualifications for recipients of welfare be based on moral or economic criteria?
G. Eidskog, the leading Socialist Party representative, was the first to develop the moral argument. Interestingly, however, the weakness of the social clients was only a secondary theme in the early phase of the discussion. He did not argue that the reduction of payments would increase the weakness of these people, but rather that the politicians themselves were not in a moral position to make such a move. He referred to the recent, positive developments in the credit market, which had given most people -'people like us', he emphasized -more money. 'This', he said, 'is about morality. One cannot cut down people who haven't received what we've got.' Furthermore, he added the more practical argument that even though one might craft a majority behind the proposal, it would not help, since the clients are only moved around from one municipal budget post to another anyway. 'Basically, this is manipulating with numbers', he pointed out.
Everyone who supported the proposal to reduce the municipal budget underscored that it was really against their their will to do so. They insisted that in the last analysis, they really had no choice. O. Sandvik, for instance, who spoke on behalf of the Labor Party, said that while he was sympathetic to G. Eidskog's argument, it was necessary to consider more than this case alone. To him, helheten ('the whole') -that is to say the budget balance -was crucial.
The leading conservative representative, W. Norheim, also took issue with G. Eidskog's argument that the proposal would result in nothing but 'manipulat[ion] with numbers' and pointed out that the problem was 'real' and that the Committee was pålagt ('forced') by higher authorities to make this decision. She added that the experience of going through hard times is not limited to welfare clients: 'Other people are struggling too. Some have to sell their houses and buy smaller apartments.' O. Sandvik protested against this and told her that to sell a house worth a million kroner is a reasonable thing to do, but that it is really something wholly different to experiencing real economic problems. W. Norheim replied by saying, 'I am talking about people like you and me. ' The debate was concluded by the KRF (Christian Democratic Party) representative, who reformulated the overall need to save money as follows: 'We have to put our efforts together in order to save . . . G. Eidskog is concerned about the social aspect, and that's good, but we have to save money.' Sandvik supported this argument and emphasized once again that the Committee was forced to save. 'Besides', he added, 'there are many weak groups, and G. Eidskog has talked about other groups before.' By this statement, O. Sandvik referred to the alleged tendency among Socialist Party representatives to apply the criterion of weakness too uncritically, thus leaving the municipality with too great a burden.
During this first phase, the politicians established two different frames of reference. Both related to alternative and conflicting constructions of 'self '. The Socialist Party representative presented the case as one involving the very idea of the welfare state's, or the municipality's, responsibility toward the weak. His argument accentuated what we may call a hierarchical understanding (Kapferer, 1988) of the welfare state and municipality. According to this understanding, the whole has priority over its parts and is a moral entity in itself. The welfare state is understood as a moral entity whose integrity depends on how the weak are treated. As seen in this representative's argument, this morality is the core reference point from which politicians who identify with this position proceed. The opponents in this case chose not to apply this understanding, and saw themselves as autonomous moral agents vis-à-vis the clients whose loyalty towards the municipal organization was symbolized through fiscal restraint.
Both understandings constitute possible, and potentially legitimate, options for the politicians. However, they see both as being deeply problematic. The traditional hierarchical option connecting the welfare of marginal clients to the integrity of the welfare state is increasingly experienced as more or less naive and simplistic because 'everyone knows' that clients can no longer be expected to be of the 'deserving kind'. At the same time, the municipality is no longer simply a compensatory device stretching out to solve problems on everyone's behalf. Rather, as a local politician, one is responsible for the task of guarding municipal boundaries from the surrounding environment, particularly free-loaders from elsewhere.
This understanding is problematic because it undermines the very project local politicians tend to see themselves involved in: that of strengthening the welfare society by securing decent living conditions for everyone. As we shall see later, those 'elite politicians' and leading administrators who argue the strongest for limiting municipal costs are, most of the time, the primary targets of moral criticism. In other words, both welfare clients and the municipal organizations have become ambivalent phenomena. As a result, local politicians seem confused as to how they should regard themselves in relation to their ambitions concerning welfare policies. In addition, their rhetorical strategies and decisions are frequently ad hoc, rather than expressions of a cohesive political program.
Phase 2: staging a rebellion
The budget discussions became more difficult and tense later the same fall. In the period prior to the final budget debate, shortly after the welfare issue had been discussed, it was commonly accepted that the task would be a tough one. This was so not because the municipality and the Health and Welfare (HW) sector had to reduce their activity, but rather that within the proposed budget it seemed impossible to satisfy the increasing demands of the public. This increase was mainly due to the rising number of elderly people who would be in need of municipal care in the near future. The HW Director said, 'This development does not follow the budget at all.'
In the eyes of administrative personnel and politicians alike, the amount and quality of services would -if nothing were done -have to be reduced. So the first question was how to establish priorities within the budget, and secondly, whether or not they should ask the Assembly for more money. The background material presented to the politicians was in one sense clear-cut. It described possible moves that could be taken in order to maintain the budget balance and the responsibility toward the Assembly, represented by the rådmannen (the chief administrator of the municipality). The HW Director's primary loyalty is towards the rådmannen. Thus the background material was profoundly shaped by the imperative to maintain budget balance. On the other hand, the message of the professionals was fundamentally shaped by a sense of crisis. Therefore, the HW Director was caught in a difficult role of conflict between budget loyalty and professional advice. Hence, at the outset of the debate, she had to clarify to the politicians that although it was an uncomfortable situation, she was formally affiliated with the administrators: 'I understand you perfectly well, but I have to act on behalf of the rådmannen. If you want larger budgets, you have to work on a broader basis and discuss it in your parties. ' As we shall see later, the Director's choice gave rise to strong disagreements at a later stage of the process, because it conflicted with the politicians' solution to their own dilemma. This solution was to reject the budget frame for which they themselves -in their capacity as members of the Assembly -were formally responsible. This generated a perspective and a line of argument radically different from the ones that dominated the debate on welfare payments.
As the representatives entered the room where the meeting was held, they all expressed a sense of relief that contrasted strongly with the seriousness expressed in their faces only a few days earlier. The issue had been discussed informally prior to the meeting and a basic consensus had been achieved. The budget meeting was opened with a presentation of the consensus. W. Norheim opened this part of the meeting in the following fashion:
Budget discussions are seldom happy occasions. I have been a part of this for six years, and there have been cut-backs all the time. We are struggling and suffering, and we are now in the process of cutting away the rest. Large groups are unable to satisfy their needs. We are caught in a swamp for which we cannot take responsibility in the future. The situation for the elderly is telling: we need twenty-three million kroners and have to cut away four million.
It is said that politicians are unwilling to take responsibility. We take responsibility for the clients; it is towards them we now turn our focus. We know more about the problem than other politicians, and they ought to listen more closely to us. All parties agree with this. It was a good experience, in fact, and there was really no controversy. We have reached the limit! We are not interested in participating in the suffering any more. We will never be able to get out of this mess if we don't say stop now! This position set the stage for the rest of the meeting. Most importantly, it defined the kind of loyalty that was to count as fundamental. Once this was done, the definition of responsibility followed more or less automatically. The other speakers sought to add more substance and legitimacy to the version already presented by W. Norheim, and the meeting was really not characterized by political discussion at all, but rather by a series of more or less repetitive presentations. C. Eng formulated his version of the consensus in this way:
After having participated in the preliminary discussions my mind was much lighter. This has been a plague for a long time . . . This is a signal to the political establishment that it must dare to take responsibility for other sectors and put life values before cultural and technical values. The pressure on our employees is intolerable. We have been running from catastrophe to catastrophe and from media coverage to media coverage.
C. Eng's presentation further stressed the need for doing something dramatic to counteract the existing situation. While all the protagonists in this welfare debate saw the need to save money as 'natural' and in harmony with 'reality', in this situation they did not view the budget primarily as an index of a lack of funds, but rather as a signifier of authentic suffering. It was this suffering that made the Committee see its own protest against the budget proposal as a heroic act. C. Eng stressed that, 'Now we have to fight against elite politicians in all parties.' G. Eidskog followed him saying, 'We agree roughly on how we want to make the priorities. We all have to fight. If they don't understand it, it is us who have failed. We are talking about human destinies here.' The sense of relief thus created was most clearly enunciated by B. Asbjørnsen, a Labor Party representative, who said, 'This feels so good, because now the Committee speaks as one. In our sector people may be dying, but now we want no more of this!' Later, in the break and over a cup of coffee, he told me and the others present that at last he was able to 'craft policies with the mind and the body on behalf of those for whom we are responsible'. He placed his hand gently on his stomach to illustrate how well he felt about this.
Even though the Committee was unanimous and characterized by a strong sense of relief, one politician, A. Langset, injected a tiny dose of doubt at the meeting. He warned the others against the tendency to underestimate other politicians and indicated that perhaps the chosen line of action was not in harmony with the idea of responsibility at all:
We are in a position where we have to point out that we cannot afford everything we want. Perhaps we should have been awake a little earlier, but in Skien we have seen who's joining the protest marches. But don't underestimate our political colleagues. They know how things are, and they know it from the newspapers too.
The reference to the protest marches was a comment on popular participation in Skien. Prior to the budget debate, the politicians had witnessed a series of protest marches involving teachers, students and parents protesting against reductions in school budgets. Many politicians thought that these people were really 'the resourceful ones', using their strength to put pressure on politicians and, thus, indirectly threatening those who were weak in a more genuine sense. Politicians were also disappointed that people would demand more money so bluntly, without considering the actual financial situation with which politicians had to contend.
The meeting was socially constructed as a reaction and protest against an 'enemy' that was not present. In the break, I talked with the administrative leader of the social services, and informally he admitted that he felt greatly relieved, but that the whole situation had put him i et forferdelig rolledilemma ('in a terrible role dilemma'), whereby his conscience and responsibility towards his subordinates and clients collided with his formal loyalty. He noted that the courageous decision made by the politicians removed this dilemma.
However, the us-them construction was not complete. Everybody knew that the director felt ill at ease with the protest, which conflicted with the interests of the råd-mannen. G. Eidskog was particularly aware of this, and stated at the end of the budget session that, 'I expect that the administration is loyal towards the politicians and that it doesn't stå skolerett (subordinate itself ) to the will of the rådmannen. ' This meeting involved the most dramatic political decision I witnessed during my fieldwork in Skien. The drama and the radicalism involved were unique. It was radical in the sense that it rejected the authoritative definition of budget responsibility; in fact it put an end to the budgetary process in the form in which it was intended. Lastly, it introduced an alternative political cleavage between the 'grassroots' and what became categorized as 'the elite politicians'.
In this phase, the entire Committee chose to apply the understanding promoted by the Socialist Party representative in the first phase -the very same type of understanding its members, at that time, portrayed as naive and simplistic. Though the two cases described in Phases 1 and 2 were virtually identical, the representatives had radically changed their opinion over time. By Phase 2 they were all convinced that any other path of action would have been deeply immoral. This time, neither the 'weak in society' nor the municipality and its responsibility were ambivalent and contradictory. The moral pathos involved in the making of consensus relieved the Committee members of a major dilemma and harmonized their deeply felt political conviction with action. They returned to the classical social democratic model of political thinking, founded upon the idea that politics is a moral struggle between unitary groups of people distinguishable by the criterion of class and class interest, the primary expression of which is responsibility for the weak. In this way they tried to force 'elite politicians in all parties' to give way. For the time being, they ignored the fact that 'the elite politicians' in fact included themselves who, in their capacity as members of the Municipal Assembly, were responsible for the budget proposal against which they had fought their moral battle. This, it may be noted, was the prize for transforming themselves from responsible managers of scarce resources, thus protecting themselves from those likely to misuse municipal funds (welfare clients), to agents of a collective and 'pure' morality. Another transformation was that, as the basic dilemma was, at least temporarily, shifted to the HW Director (who saw herself as responsible for the rådmannen and, ultimately, the Assembly), it had changed its form. As will be shown below, what in this context was a political problem became a classical administrative question of loyalty in the next.
Phase 3: contesting loyalty
One week later, the Committee came together to discuss the matter once again. The premise for the discussion was to follow the decision made the week before and support it with more background material on how much money the sector would need in order to maintain municipal health and welfare services at an akseptabelt nivå ('acceptable level'). A week earlier the administration was assigned the task of preparing this material as quickly as possible. In accordance with the new political strategy the politicians repeated and intensified their arguments, and emphasized even more strongly the idea that health and welfare policies are special because they involve human beings in more direct ways than is the case in other sectors. However, the meeting turned out to be a major setback, and in what follows we shall see why.
The material that W. Norheim and her colleagues had requested the week before was not yet prepared. W. Norheim expressed her disappointment in these terms: 'Here we go again. This is serious, because we are dealing with living human beings . . . The budget is immoral and unethical. I use strong words, but I mean it. I had hoped that other politicians would listen to us.' 'Other politicians' refers to the 'elite politicians in all parties', against whom she wanted the HW Committee to mobilize and fight. 'Other politicians' primarily refers to the Plan and Economy Committee, which serves as a preparatory forum for the Council (without decision-making power), and which consists of two Labor Party representatives and one from each of the other parties (except from The Liberal Party). W. Norheim felt that the absence of the supporting material they had requested had something to do with a lack of support from the Plan and Economy Committee (PEC). The HW Director had already indicated this at the beginning of the meeting. She had pointed out that she was not sure whether everyone understood what 'the new budget process', as it was then commonly known, really meant. In short, this 'new budget process' was framed by her as an experiment and an adjustment to the new Municipal Law. This law gave room for a more active role on the part of the politicians (at the cost of the administration) in the preparatory phase of the budgetary process. So this year it was the Council and not the rådmannen who presented the budget proposal. The Director's statement was a careful attempt to explain that her own, and supposedly the Committee's, role was to follow the political guidelines which were formulated by the Council. To provide the new material and pursue this new path of action was seen by her as being in conflict with these guidelines.
W. Norheim's frustration over the fact that the material wasn't there seemed to be shared by everyone present, but no one was really sure how to formulate it. Hence, O. Sandvik chose to follow W. Norheim's reasoning in her attack on other politicians and said, 'other politicians say that we should not involve our emotions in what we're doing, and I'm tired of that. Emotions have to be involved. We want to support those who need it the most.' C. Eng also supported this view but added that he was disappointed that he hadn't received the professional help he had hoped for, '. . . in order to give a description of reality which could make the situation more visible'. He needed that because, as he said, it was difficult to have to prepare oneself for ens egen dødsdom ('one's own death sentence').
This comment opened the way for a clearer delineation of the HW Director's standpoint, which she had presented so carefully at the beginning of the meeting. She said that the whole matter is a difficult one because it really is about 'your relationship to other politicians'. This perspective was seen as extremely provoking, and D. Eide, one of the two Socialist Party representatives, asked aggressively: 'Stop me if I'm wrong, but I thought we were all riding the same horse and had the same goal. To whom are you loyal?'
To this question, the HW Director sharpened her original statement, explaining that the political responsibility was theirs, while her loyalty must be towards the rådmannen, who in turn follows the general budget guidelines made earlier by the Assembly. The logical outcome for the Committee members, then, would be to make a greater political effort at an earlier stage of the budget process. The implication of this statement was, of course, that the politicians were now really protesting against decisions made by themselves.
The situation was very hostile and uncomfortable and became much more so when C. Eng responded by confronting all the director's deputies by asking them 'to whom [are you] loyal'. Formally, their personal views were, of course, irrelevant, and their professional advice -which was unambiguous and in perfect harmony with the Committee's position at the last meeting -had clearly been reformulated by the HW Director. Hence, they could say nothing, just sit there and hope to escape the terror of being caught in a political-bureaucratic cross-fire.
Although they were deeply disappointed, the politicians could do little except repeat their frustration and protests. As it turned out, the tension was instrumental in further stimulating the sense of relief and unconditional loyalty towards the weak ones that was developed the week before. B. Asbjørnsen formulated this feeling as follows: 'Now I banner i kjerka ('swear in the church') and say what I feel. I have often wondered if I participate in politics for the wrong reasons. People say that we're not involved in politics but rather in administration. Are the criteria for participating that you must be an accountant or a cashier?' W. Norheim's earlier comment also indicated that the Director's argument was not convincing. She continued to talk about the Council as 'other politicians': 'I feel like a fender. I have the sense that someone is more concerned with dealing with numbers than with solving problems.'
In this phase, the politicians gave up their struggle when faced with the HW Director's argument that the administration was caught in a conflict of interest that was political and should be treated as such. It is interesting to note here that the director's protest expressed a very widespread frustration in the municipal administration: that it was forced to carry out the good intentions on behalf of the politicians while, at the same time, being economically 'strangled'. This is why the somewhat paradoxical conflict of interest between the HW Director and her deputies occurred in the meeting, shown by the incident when she refused to let them speak, even when confronted directly by the politicians' questions. Their hope was clearly that the rebellion would solve their dilemma which they viewed as consisting of having to provide universal welfare while being very badly equipped with the resources to do so. The result is constant pressure from below, from street-level bureaucrats who are fed up with being continually confronted by clients' complaints and suffering on the one hand, and increased administrative control and regulation of their work from above, on the other.
Characteristically, much of the problem-solving discourse for such conflicts in the municipal system takes the form of accusations of disloyalty. The case just described illustrates (i) the very close relationship between the basic structural contradiction of the welfare state; (ii) the filtering of this contradiction through historically constructed but, nonetheless, situationally-defined models of the current political reality; and (iii) the tendency to view problems in the implementation of welfare policies as a consequence of moral deficiencies among street-level bureaucrats, that is, as disloyalty.
MAKING SENSE OF THE CRISIS
We have seen that local politicians make use of several models of understanding which appear more or less contradictory. The most desirable model is one I have labeled the welfare ideology, emphasizing the state's and the municipality's responsibility towards the 'weak' in society. According to this ideology, the politician is not necessarily a representative of the municipal organization, but the advocate of some external category of people. The second model is one where the local political identity is that of a guardian of the organization, its budget and its boundaries. As an extension of this model, the management orientation increasingly adopted by local politicians disposes them to see themselves as managers of municipal employees and acting according to ideals of efficiency and coordination. In the second model municipal employees are seen primarily as tools for the realization of instrumental goals and, simultaneously, as potential 'traitors'. The last aspect is made relevant as a general discourse of loyalty in the municipality, based upon the general suspicions that municipal employees are more loyal to their clients than to their employers, thus blurring identities and the organizational boundary.
In the phases discussed earlier in this article, we see that these models serve as 'pure types' in that they tend to be applied as alternative, more or less mutually exclusive, options. Interestingly, the switching back and forth between them has made them available for reflection. The consequence of this shifting orientation is that, among other things, the external reality to which each model points has become increasingly complex and ambivalent. 'Weak groups' are no longer simply weak. Moreover, the category of 'people' or 'the population' is problematized: as those who not only act as grateful recipients of municipal care and support, but who also constitute a relatively aggressive and cynical assembly of voices, criticizing politicians for being hypocrites and not doing what they are supposed to, and promise to, do.
The municipal organization is, increasingly, seen as fragmented, and municipal employees are not simply viewed as 'professionals', but also as groups promoting their own interests, masquerading as welfare talk. Politicians often see them not only as allies in their struggle against the political and administrative elites, but also as people possessing expertise (Bauman, 1991) . We may also note that 'the morality of money' differs according to the politicians' various identifications. Sometimes money is a tool to be used in solving the problems of the weak, and at other times it is seen as the very essence of the welfare municipality and, accordingly, something that needs to be protected.
These ambivalences are not simply rhetorical or existential, but products of strategies backed up by concrete institutions, law or social collectives. This is why it seems reasonable to argue that the complexity thus constructed is unique among modern institutions. These ambivalences have been accumulated as products of the Norwegian welfare state's historical trajectory and, to a large extent, are impossible to differentiate clearly in concrete situations because of the continuous insistence that, despite fundamental problems and new challenges, the state guarantees universal welfare. At the same time, the state and the primary provider of service, the municipality, are supposed to guard their own boundaries (by controlling costs, the amount and type of services, and employees). This contradiction allows for all categories of actors to appear as hybrids, not simply as actors embodying several cultural traditions simultaneously, but as carriers of performances that do not logically articulate with each other but, nevertheless, generate concreteeconomic, social, existential -results.
These models of understanding and strategies are not simply resources which serve distinguishable groups. On the contrary, they provide tools to be used in specific contexts. Thus, one observes politicians who appear to be aggressive welfare politicians in one situation, only to appear as their own enemy in the next, preaching the gospel of budget responsibility. Indeed, this is not surprising given the fact that they carry very different and potentially conflicting roles within the municipal organization. The individual as a social person, through managing his or her own internal differentiation and subjectivity, reflects the complexity of the organization. Politically, this has far-reaching consequences because the earlier political divisions between left and right and between political parties representing different segments of the population have largely eroded and become integrated within the individual person. The basic contradictions of the municipal organization are reflected in the shifting orientations of local politicians, who represent different ambitions in different situations, often during the very same decisionmaking process. Interestingly, it is far easier to detect this 'schizophrenia' in the lower levels of municipal organizations than at the top. As a consequence, there is reason to believe that what we have encountered is a decentralization of the dilemma. The experience of such dilemmas must be understood as the outcome of systematic attempts to eliminate complexity and ambiguity in a system which is so complex that any incomplete attempt at elimination generates greater complexity and ambiguity at another, lower, level.
The ideological ideal types specified here are, in real situations, mixed, and thus hard to distinguish. This is so not only because they are combined in the literal sense, but because they seem to have transformed each other (Sider, 1986) . For example, it is easy to see that the welfare ideology has been 'injected', as it were, by consumerist impulses, making it harder for local politicians and employees alike to distinguish between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' needs. Thus one observes local politicians talk about the elderly, whose needs and helplessness carry a strong ideological legitimacy in public debate, as a 'weak group', while the very same politicians concern themselves with welfare clients who 'cheat'. The consumerist model has increased the emphasis on a factor which was largely unmentioned during the Social Democratic period, namely, the expectation that as a member of a welfare community, one is not only supposed to receive 'passively', but to also make an effort to provide for oneself. In the same vein, we have seen that politicians, when confronted by popular mobilization, increasingly suspect that those mobilizing are being inauthentic.
CONCLUSIONS
Increasingly, the public sector of most Western countries seems to suffer what Habermas has labeled a legitimacy crisis (1975) . According to Habermas, this crisis results from the overload problem so characteristic of welfare systems, the responsibility of which is to absorb and compensate for market problems, including more general marginalization problems. Giddens (1998) has recently argued that public welfare systems must seek other options in order to escape the vicious cycle resulting from the responsibility to take care of people.
Most welfare regimes have never assumed responsibility on this broad scale, and do not make themselves directly responsible for compensating for undesirable market effects. In this regard, the Norwegian model is unique (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kuhnle, 2000) . The degree of market supplements to public welfare is still marginal, and the peculiar lack of deep class divisions has contributed to a strong sense of belonging to a moral community. Human suffering is still often seen as a problem undermining the very integrity of the moral community. Thus demands for public welfare have only, to a very limited degree, been modified by mechanisms of exclusion. As a result, the state and the municipal sector are still absorbing their environment and are largely unable to control their own boundaries.
In the case study described in this article, we saw that local politicians deal with complex identities, struggling to unite their contradictory roles as advocates for the weak, spokespersons for traditional ideas concerning the quality and responsibility of the welfare municipality, economic functionaries, and managers of a complex organization. Unlike most other organizations, the municipality has not been able to discipline its personnel according to an overarching set of principles. This problem reflects the municipality's own environment in a broad sense, and thus it is unable to define itself by construing its environment as consisting simply of customers and sellers. Rather, the municipality integrates itself into the complexity of the very same environment. Simultaneously, it is supposed to shape that environment as well as be controlled by it. However, due to the actual attempts to establish control through measures of budgetary and administrative discipline, the municipality does in many ways practice a policy of autonomy in the sense that it attempts to harmonize the relationship between input and output. But while such efforts create control at one level, they generate deep disorder at other levels. This process was indirectly touched upon in the case given here, in the discussion of administrative loyalty. The attempt to solve problems and, in Bauman's terms, establish order and get rid of ambivalence, creates new kinds of ambivalence at other levels, characteristically further down in the hierarchy. Such problems tend to mobilize alliances between politicians. Consequently, the opinion and support of street-level bureaucrats, who may back their case by appeals to national laws or moral sentiments in the population, cannot be excluded.
Continuing this line of reasoning, a comment must be made here on complexity. Bauman's hypothesis in Modernity and Ambivalence (1991) is, as a Douglasian perspective on purity and danger, not only that ambivalence is the focus of systematic attack and disciplinary measures, but that this ambivalence is increasingly privatized. This, I argue, is the case in the welfare municipality and is due to factors that are of considerable comparative interest. In most cases, witch hunts, or whatever serves as the manifestation of 'dirt' or ambivalence, tend to unite and create collectivities. In modern organizations -the prototype of which is private business organizations -the same effect tends to occur, simply because they operate on the basis of unambiguous relations of power (it is, for the most part, easy to learn whether or not the business makes money, and to sack employees who are somehow seen as superfluous).
For the Norwegian welfare municipality there is no unambiguous 'other', there is no easily defined 'product', there is no clear-cut definition of success and, finally, the demand for these services is not only unlimited but one has a legal or moral duty to satisfy it. In the social democratic era such difficult premises were, in a sense, handled by the shared projection of external 'enemies': poverty and undisciplined nature. The population and the state were (and are), to a great extent, united in the common struggle to expand the phenomenon Beck (1992) has labeled 'simple modernization', and problems that arose were defined as temporary insufficiencies due to a lack of development. Moreover, to the extent that the contradictions of the welfare state were subject to discourse, they served to unify identities, sewing the individual and the collective together. Until the 1970s, political issues were largely, directly or indirectly, understood in terms of class and their respective ideological basis reflected class interests. Thus when problems relating to overload occurred, they were mostly understood from an 'us-them' perspective which underwrote various collective identities.
In contemporary Norway this is no longer the case; increasing ambivalence has, to an increasing degree, become privatized. This is because many of those who make up municipal organizations, particularly local politicians, are forced to take on several, more or less contradictory roles simultaneously. Consequently, knowingly or not, many politicians are their own worst enemies. As spokespersons in the Health and Welfare Committee, local politicians oppose 'elite politicians in all parties', but these elite politicians are likely to be themselves. Because all the different processes in which these politicians are involved are formally, albeit insufficiently, co-ordinated, politicians cannot escape the problem of being responsible, not only for the services they actually provide, but also for societal problems far beyond their actual control. Thus, there is no way out, and since the collective identities related to the left-right axis have largely disappeared -giving way to the realization that municipal policies are most of all dependent upon responsible, individual politicians, and not 'ideological collectives' -they experience political problems as problems of conscience and subjective integration.
